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ABSTRACT 
 
The Political Economy of Labor Market Regulation with R&D* 
 
In this paper, I study the political rationale for labor market regulation. Oligopolists employ 
raw labor and human capital (i.e. key workers) for production and R&D. There are many 
jurisdictions, in each of which a self-interested policy maker can regulate/deregulate the local 
labor market. I show that the observed tendency to labor market deregulation results from 
labor market policies being set up at the local level. In small jurisdictions, the fall of income 
due to wage increases is so large that the labor markets are deregulated. With labor market 
integration, jurisdictions get larger and face less competition from outside. Then, the fall of 
income due to wage increases is reduced and labor market regulation becomes more 
attractive to workers’ lobbies. 
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1 Introduction
In this document, I examine the political economy of labor market regulation
in an economy where rms have incentives to escape labor costs by perform-
ing research and development (R&D). The policy makers are assumed to be
self-interested, subject to lobbying from employers and labor unions.
Unionization has declined in most OECD countries since the 1980s (Nick-
ell et al. 2005, pp. 6-7). In particular, in the years 1975-2000, labor markets
have been rapidly deregulated in the US and UK (Acemoglu et al. 2001).
International trade (in particular outsourcing) has undermined union bar-
gaining power (cf. Abraham et al. 2009, Dumont at al. 2005, 2012, Boulhol
et al. 2011). Protection of regular employment contracts was diminsihed
when globalization was proceeding rapidly (Potrafke 2010). On the other
hand, there is little evidence of international trade having an impact on the
workers' bargaining power (Brock and Dobbelaere 2006). In this document, I
explain declining union power as follows. Assume that economic integration
increases the size of the economy, except that labor market policies are still
set up at the local level. Because a local policy maker controls only a small
proportion of the integrated labor markers, it has less changes to exercise
independent policy. This makes lobbying for labor market regulation less
attractive to workers' lobbies.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 con-
siders the related literature on the topic. Section 3 characterizes the insti-
tutional structure of the economy. Sections 4 and 5 construct the specic
models of the households, nal-good rms and inter-mediate-good industries,
respectively. Section 6 establishes a common agency game where employers
and workers lobby decision makers. Sections 7 and 8 construct the political
equilibrium, on which the results are based, and section 9 focuses on welfare
eects of labor market integration.
2 Related literature
Acemoglu et al. (2001) explain declining unionization by skill-biased tech-
nological change which increases the outside option of skilled workers, un-
dermining the coalition among skilled and unskilled workers in support of
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unions. In this document, I explain the same development by a political pro-
cess in which workers and employers lobby policy makers on labor market
regulation. Palokangas (2003) argues that distorting taxation causes labor
market regulation. In a model where employers and workers bargain over
wages and lobby the government for taxation and labor market regulation,
he shows that if it is much easier to tax wages than prots, then the govern-
ment protects union power by labor market regulation. In this document, I
introduce in-house R&D as an alternative cause of labor market regulation:
rms invest in R&D to escape labor costs due to high wages.
The growth eects of union power depend decisively on the structure of
the economy. Labor unions impose minimum wages that cause unemploy-
ment. If the same technology were used both in production and in R&D,
then union power would decrease prots, undermining incentives to invest in
productivity-enhancing R&D (cf. Peretto 2011). In that case, an increase in
union wages decreases both employment and the productivity growth rate.
There is, however, contrasting empirical evidence. Caballero (1993) and
Hoon and Phelps (1997) nd a positive dependence between unemployment
and productivity growth. Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2010) show that the an-
nual percentage growth of real wages has a positive eect on growth in value
added per labor hour. In that case, exible (i.e. deregulated) labor markets
can lead the combination of high employment and slow productivity growth.
Palokangas (1996, 2000, 2004) establishes a positive dependence between
unemployment and productivity growth by the assumption that production
and R&D are subject to dierent technology. He assumes two categories
of labor: key workers (call human capital, for convenience) are used both in
production and R&D, while ordinary workers (call \raw" labor) are used only
in production. When the minimum wages for ordinary workers increase, rms
lay out labor, but transfer human capital from production to productivity-
enhancing R&D to escape labor costs. In this document, I assume that R&D
plays a decisive role in labor marker policy. In the presence of cost-escaping
R&D, workers can accept unemployment in exchange for higher prospective
labor income. Labor market regulation increases wages, decreasing output
and transferring human capital from production to R&D. This promotes
R&D, raising productivity and prospective income.
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Labor market policy can be endogenized either by majority voting (cf.
Saint-Paul 2002a, 2002b), all-pay auctioning, in which the lobbyist making
the greater eort wins with certainty (cf. Johal and Ulph 2002), or menu
actioning, in which the lobbyists announce their bids contingent on the policy
maker's actions (cf. Grossman and Helpman 1994, Dixit et al 1997). Because
I am interested in relative union bargaining power, which is not a discrete
variable, majority voting is not applied in this document. In the all-pay
auctioning, lobbying expenditures are incurred by all the lobbyists before
the policy maker takes an action. This is the case e.g. when interest groups
spend money to increase the probability of getting their favorite type of
government elected. In menu auctioning, it is not possible for a lobbyist
to spend money and eort on lobbying without getting what he lobbied
for. Because the menu-auction model is better associated with the case in
which the policy maker's decision variable (e.g. relative union bargaining
power) is continuous and interest groups can obtain marginal improvements
for themselves by lobbying, I apply it in this document.
3 The economy
The households supply two primary inputs inelastically: human capital H,
which consists of skilled key workers, and (raw) labor L. The institutional
dierence between these inputs is that human capital can be used both in
production and in research (R&D), while labor only in production. There is a
\continuum" of industries i 2 [0; 1]. In each industry i 2 [0; 1], one oligopolist
(labeled i) produces a dierent high-tech good (labeled i). Competitive rms
produce the consumption good from the intermediate goods i 2 [0; 1].
The market for human capital is competitive. Oligopolist i bargains over
the wage with a labor union (labeled i) that represents its labor. The indus-
tries i 2 [0; 1] are organized in a number n of equal but disjoint jurisdictions,
each of which determines relative union bargaining power independently:
[0; 1] =
n[
k=1
Bk; Bk
\
B` = ; for k 6= `, 1
n
:
=
Z
i2Bk
di; (1)
where Bk is the set of industries belonging to jurisdiction k 2 [0; n].
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i € Bk
Labour union 
i € Bk
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bargaining
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maker
The level of
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The level of 
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Figure 1: The political equilibrium in jurisdiction k 2 [0; n].
In jurisdiction k 2 [0; n], there is a policy maker (labeled k) which deter-
mines relative union bargaining power, an employer lobby (labeled k) that
represents oligopolists i 2 Bk, and a union lobby (labeled k) that represents
the workers of those oligopolists. Because human capital is fully employed,
it has no lobby of its own. The lobbies inuence the policy maker by their
political contributions. Labor market integration decreases the mass n, but
increases the size 1
n
of jurisdictions.
In industry i 2 [0; 1], the supply of labor is given by Li, the supply of
human capital by Hi, the demand for labor and human capital in production
by li and hi, respectively, and the demand for human capital in R&D by zi.
Labor and human capital can freely move between the industries i 2 [0; 1]:
L =
Z
i2[0;1]
Lidi; H =
Z
i2[0;1]
Hidi: (2)
The market clearing conditions for human capital and the full-employment
constraints for labor are given by:
hi + zi = Hi; li  Li; i 2 [0; 1]: (3)
In this document, the common agency model (c.f. Bernheim and Whin-
ston 1986, Grossman and Helpman 1994, and Dixit et al. 1997) is used
to establish the political equilibrium (cf. Fig. 1). The players are house-
holds that consume, competitive rms that produce the consumption good,
oligopolists that make intermediate goods, labor unions, labor and employer
lobbies, and policy makers. Their decisions form the following sequence:
1. Labor and human capital choose their location among industries.
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2. Employer and union lobbies inuence policy makers, relating their
prospective political contributions to the latter's decisions.
3. Policy makers set relative union bargaining power.
4. Oligopolists and unions bargain over wages for labor.
5. Oligopolists produce and perform R&D.
6. Salaries adjust to balance the markets for human capital.
7. Oligopolists employ human capital in production.
8. Competitive rms make the nal good from the oligopolists' outputs.
9. The households plan their consumption over time.
This game is solved in reverse order: stages 9 and 8 in section 4, stages 7, 6,
5 and 4 in section 5, and stages 3, 2 and 1 in section 6.
4 Households and nal-goods producers
Provided that all households in the economy share the same preferences, they
can be represented by a single household that chooses its ow of consumption
c to maximize its utility starting at time T ,Z 1
T
(log c)e ( T )d; (4)
where  is time, c consumption and  > 0 the constant rate of time preference.
This utility maximization leads to the Euler equation
_X=X = r    with X := P cc; (5)
where P c the consumption price index, X consumption expenditure, r the
interest rate and _X
:
= dX=d. Because in the model there is no money that
would pin down the nominal price level at any time, one can normalize the
households' total consumption expenditure X at unity. This and (5) yield
P cc = X = 1; P c = 1=c; r =  = constant > 0: (6)
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The outputs yi of oligopolists i 2 [0; 1] are substitutes. Competitive rms
make the consumption good from these through CES technology:
c =
Z 1
0
Aiy
1 1=
i di
=( 1)
with constant  > 1, (7)
where  is the elasticity of product substitution and Ai the productivity of
good i in providing services to the households. Oligopolist i can increase its
productivity Ai by investing in R&D.
Because all consumption-good producers are competitive, they can be
represented by a single rm that maximizes its prot Pc   R 1
0
piyidi by its
inputs yi; i 2 [0; 1], subject to technology (7), given the output price P and
the input prices pi, i 2 [0; 1]. Given this and (6), the prot maximization
yields the inverse demand curve of oligopolist i:
pi = P
@c
@yi
= PAi

c
yi
1=
= Aic
1= 1y 1=i : (8)
5 Industry i
Oligopolist i and union i take the macroeconomic variables, the interest rate
r and aggregate consumption c, as given. They pay political contributions
Rio and R
i
u, respectively, to the policy maker of their jurisdiction. Because R
i
o
and Riu are determined by lobbying at the level of the jurisdiction, oligopolist
i and union i take them given as well.
5.1 Technological change
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1998), the
arrival rate of innovations i is assumed to follow a Poisson process being in
xed proportion  to innovation intensity zi for each oligopolist i 2 [0; 1]:
i = zi;  > 0; zi  0: (9)
The serial number of technology for oligopolist i is denoted by ti and pro-
ductivity corresponding to that technology by Ai(ti). It is assumed that an
invention of a new technology raises ti by one and Ai(ti) by constant a > 1:
Ai(ti + 1) = aAi(ti); a > 1: (10)
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In Appendix A, I show that the expected average growth rate gi of produc-
tivity Ai(ti) is in xed proportion to labor devoted to R&D, zi,
gi = (log a)zi; (11)
and the expected value of the ow of productivity Ai at time T is given by
E
Z 1
T
Aie
 r( T )d =
AiT
r + (1  a)zi ; (12)
where E is the expectation operator and AiT is productivity Ai at time T .
5.2 Production and R&D
Oligopolist i produces its output yi from labor li and human capital hi ac-
cording to the CES function
yi = F (li; hi); Fl
:
=
@F
@li
> 0; Fh
:
=
@F
@hi
> 0; Fll
:
=
@2F
@li
2 < 0;
Fhh
:
=
@2F
@h2i
< 0; Fl h
:
=
@2F
@li@hi
> 0;
FlFh
Fl hF
= ' 2 (0; 1) [ (1;1); (13)
where ' is the constant elasticity of factor substitution. It employs human
capital zi for its in-house R&D and pays the wage Wi for labor li and the
salary Si for human capital li+ zi. Its prot i is equal to sales revenue piyi
minus wages Wili, salaries Si(li + zi) and political contributions R
i
o. Noting
the inverse demand curve (8) and the production function (13), this yields
i
:
= piyi  Wili  Rio = c1= 1Aiy1 1=i  Wili   Si(hi + zi) Rio
= c1= 1AiF (li; hi)1 1=  Wili   Si(hi + zi) Rio: (14)
Oligopolist i employs human capital in production, hi, up to the level
where the marginal product of human capital is equal to the salary Si:
Si =
@
@hi
[c1= 1AiF (li; hi)1 1=] =

1  1


c1= 1Ai
Fh(li; hi)
F (li; hi)1=
: (15)
Because oligopolist i is the only employer of human capital in industry i,
it takes the market-clearing conditions (15) and hi + zi = Hi [cf. (3)] into
account in the next stage. To obtain a stationary-state equilibrium where
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the inputs of labor and human capital are constant over time, I assume that
oligopolist i and union i bargain over the productivity-adjusted wage
wi
:
= Wi=(c
1= 1Ai); (16)
where Ai and c
1= 1 are the levels of productivity due to past investment in
R&D and aggregate consumption c, correspondingly. Noting (3), (15) and
(16), the prot of oligopolist i, (14), then becomes
i = c
1= 1Aii  Rio with
i
:
= F (li; Hi   zi)1 1=   wili  

1  1


Fh(li; Hi   zi)Hi
F (li; Hi   zi)1= : (17)
Because the system has a stationary state equilibrium, the optimum can
be solved by choosing inputs (li; zi) from the class of constant controls.
1 The
expected value of the prots (17) starting at time  = T is then [cf. (12)]
E
Z 1
T
ie
 r( T )d = ic1= 1E
Z 1
T
Ai(ti)e
 r( T )d  Rio
Z 1
T
e r( T )d
=
ic
1= 1AiT
r + (1  a)zi  
Rio
r
; (18)
Oligopolist imaximizes its value (18) by inputs (li; zi) subject to technological
change in industry i (cf. subsection 5.1), given aggregate consumption c, the
productivity-adjusted wage wi, the supplies labor of and human capital in
industry i, (Li; Hi), and political contributions R
i
o. This maximization leads
to the following value and demand functions (cf. Appendix B):
Wo
 
wi; c; R
i
o
 :
= max
li;zi
E
Z 1
T
ie
 r( T )d
= c1= 1AiT max
li;zi
i
r + (1  a)zi  
Rio
r
; (19)
li = el(wi; Hi); yi = ey(wi; Hi); zi = ez(wi; Hi);elw < 0; ezw > 0 ,  > '; eyw < 0 for  > ': (20)
The results (20) can be explained as follows. The demand for labor
falls with the productivity-adjusted wage, elw < 0. The higher the price
1With some complication, the same result can be obtained by dynamic programming
(cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994). These calculations will be provided to the reader on request.
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elasticity of output demand for an oligopolist, , the stronger the output
eect : output and the demand for human capital in production, eh, fall with
a higher productivity-adjusted wage wi. The higher the elasticity of factor
substitution, , the stronger the substitution eect : the demand for human
capital in production, eh rises with a higher productivity-adjusted wage wi.
If the elasticity of product substitution, , is greater than that of factor
substitution, , then the output eect dominates over the substitution eect
and an increase in the productivity-adjusted wage wi lowers the demand for
human capital in production. Because human capital is fully employed, this
generates a transfer of human capital from production to R&D, ezw > 0.
5.3 Collective bargaining
The workers belonging to union i earn wages Wili minus their political con-
tributions Riu. Given (16) and (20), this implies
Vi
:
= Wili  Riu = wiliAic1= 1  Riu = wiel(wi; Hi)Aic1= 1  Riu: (21)
Union i observes technological change (cf. subsection 5.1). Because inputs
(el; ez) and the productivity-adjusted wage wi are constants in equilibrium,
then, given (12), (20) and (21), the expected present value of the ow of the
union members' income (21) at time  = T is
Wu
 
wi; c; R
i
u
 :
= E
Z 1
T
Vie
 r( T )d =
c1= 1AiTwiel(wi; Hi)
r + (1  a)ez(wi; Hi)   R
i
u
r
: (22)
Oligopolist i maximizes its value function (19) and labor union i its value
function (22) by the productivity-adjusted wage wi in an alternating-oers
game, given aggregate consumption c, the interest rate r, the supply of labor
and human capital, (Li; Hi), and contributions (R
i
u; R
i
o). Both parties can
alone forestall production. Because oligopolist i (union i) earns nothing but
pays contributions Rio (R
i
u) in the case of no production, its fall-back income
is the discounted value of the ow of these contributions  Rio=r ( Riu=r).
The outcome of the alternating-oers game is obtained by maximizing
the Generalized Nash Product (GNP) of the parties' utilities (19) and (22),
(wi; c; R
i
u)
:
= i log
Wu wi; c; Riu  ( Riu=r)
+ (1  i) log
Wo wi; c; Rio  ( Rio=r)
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= (1  i)[logAiT + (1=  1) log c] + i log
Wu wi; c; Riu+Riu=r
+ (1  i)max
li;zi

log i   log[r + (1  a)zi]
	
(23)
by the productivity-adjusted wage wi, where i 2 [0; 1] is the relative bar-
gaining power of union i. It is equivalent to maximize = by wi. Given
(17), this leads to the rst-order condition
1
i
@
@wi
=
@Wu
@wi
Wu +Riu=r
+

1
i
  1

1
i
@i
@wi
=
@Wu
@wi
Wu +Riu=r
+

1  1
i

li
i
= 0:
On the assumption that the equilibrium is unique, the second-order con-
dition 1
i
@2
@wi2
< 0 holds true. Because from (17) and (20) it follows that
@
@i
 
1
i
@
@wi

= 1
2i
li
i
> 0; the productivity-adjusted wage increases with rela-
tive union bargaining power:
wi = ew(i; Hi); @wi=@i > 0: (24)
6 Lobbies and policy makers
Employer lobby k represents the oligopolists i 2 Bk and union lobby k the
workers in jurisdiction k. Relative union bargaining power i and political
contributions (Riku; R
i
ko) are uniform throughout the industries i 2 Bk of the
same jurisdiction k:
i = k, R
i
u = Rku and R
i
o = Rko for i 2 Bk. (25)
This equalizes the productivity-adjusted wages (24) in jurisdiction k:
wi = $k = ew(k) for i 2 Bk. (26)
In this document, technology spillover is modeled in line with Aghion and
Howitt (1998, pp. 87-88) as follows. Although the arrival rates in dierent
sectors are independent of each other, the innovations themselves all draw on
the same pool of shared technological knowledge. The state of this knowledge
is represented by a leading-edge technology, whose productivity parameter is
A. If oligopolist i 2 [0; 1] innovates, then it can start producing with the
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leading edge of technology. When this happens, the technology parameter
Ai in industry i 2 [0; 1] jumps discontinuously to A:
Ai = A for i 2 [0; 1]. (27)
Given (7), (20), (26) and (27), aggregate consumption c is determined by the
productivity-adjusted wages as follows (cf. Appendix C):
c($k; $ k; A; n); c

$` = $ and Hi = H for ` 2 [0; n] = A
=( 1)ey($;H);
1
c
@c
@$k

$` = $ and Hi = H for ` 2 [0; n]
=
eyw
ney < 0; $ k := f$`j ` =2 kg: (28)
Plugging (25), (26) and (28) into the utilities of oligopolist i and labor
union i, (19) and (22), yields the utility functions of employer lobby k and
union lobby k, Fk and Uk:
Fk($k; $ k; n; Rko) =Wo
 
$k; c; R
i
o

; (29)
Uk($k; $ k; n; Rku) =Wu
 
$k; c; R
i
o

: (30)
The contribution schedules of the lobbies, Rku and Rko, depend on the argu-
ments ($k; $ k; n) of their utility functions (29) and (30):
Rku($k; $ k; n); Rko($k; $ k; n): (31)
Policy maker k collects the ow of the political contributions Rko+Rku from
all oligopolists and labor unions in jurisdiction k 2 [0; n], R
i2Bk(R
i
ko+R
i
ku)di:
It maximizes the present value of this ow of income [cf. (1), (26) and (31)]:
Gk($k; $ k; n)
:
= E
Z 1
T
Z
i2Bk
(Riko +R
i
ku)di

e r( T )d =
Rko +Rku
rn
=
1
rn

Rko($k; $ k; n) +Rku($k; $ k; n)

: (32)
7 Political Equilibrium
Given (1), (20) and (26), the full-employment constraints (3) become
el($k; H)  Z
i2Bk
Lidi
Z
j2Bk
dj; k 2 [0; n]: (33)
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Employer lobby k and union lobby k inuence policy maker k over union bar-
gaining power k. These three agents take the productivity-adjusted wages
elsewhere, $ k [cf. (28)], as given and observe the full-employment constraint
(33). Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from k to $k through
(26), it is equivalent to assume that the lobbies inuence policy maker k over
the productivity-adjusted wage $k subject to (33), given $ k.
According to proposition 1 of Dixit et al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for the game between the employer lobby, the union lobby and
the policy maker in jurisdiction k is a set of contribution schedules (31) and
a policy $k s.t. the following conditions (i)  (iv) hold:
(i) The contributions of the labor and employer lobbies, Rku and Rko, are
non-negative but no more than the contributor's income.
(ii) The policy $k maximizes the policy maker's welfare (32):
$k = arg max
$k s.t. (33)
Gk($k; $ k; n): (34)
(iii) The employer (labor) lobby cannot have a feasible strategy
Rko($k; $ k; n)
 
Rku($k; $ k; n)

that yields it higher utility (29) ((30)) than in equilibrium, given the
policy maker's expected policy:
$k = arg max
$k s.t. (33)
Fk
 
$k; $ k; n; ; Rko($k; $ k; n)

;
$k = arg max
$k s.t. (33)
Uk
 
$k; $ k; n; ; Rku($k; $ k; n)

: (35)
(iv) The employer (labor) lobby provides the policy maker at least with the
level of utility than in the case where the lobby oers nothing Rko = 0
(Rku = 0), and where the policy maker responds optimally given the
other lobby's contribution function (30) ((29)).
Noting (29) and (30), the equilibrium conditions (35) become
0 =
dFk
d$k
=
@Fk
@$k
  1
r
@Rko
@$k
; 0 =
dUk
d$k
=
@Uk
@$k
  1
r
@Rku
@$k
:
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These equations are equivalent to
1
r
@Rku
@$k
=
@Uk
@$k
;
1
r
@Rko
@$k
=
@Fk
@$k
: (36)
Conditions (36) say that in equilibrium the change in the discounted con-
tributions of labor (employer) lobby k due to a change in the productivity-
adjusted wage $k equals the eect of that wage on the inter-temporal welfare
of that lobby. Thus, the contribution schedules are locally truthful. As in
Berhheim and Whinston (1997) or in Grossman and Helpman (1994), this
concept can be extended to a globally truthful contribution schedule. This
type of schedule represents the preferences of labor (employer) k at all policy
points. Given (36), the truthful contribution functions take the form
Rku = max[Uk   Uk; 0]; Rko = max[Fk  Fk; 0]; (37)
where Uk (Fk) is the welfare of labor (employer) lobby k when it does not
pay contributions but policy maker k chooses its best response, given the
contribution schedule of employer (labor) lobby k.
The threat points Uk and Fk are determined by (24), (26), (29) and
(30) and (33) as follows. If union lobby k does not pay contributions to
policy maker k, Rku = 0, then the latter decreases the relative bargaining
power i of union i, and consequently the productivity-adjusted wage $k,
to the level $k corresponding to full employment
el($k; H) = L. Thus,
Uk := Uk($k; $ k; n; Rku): If employer lobby k does not pay contributions
to policy maker k, Rko = 0, then the latter increases the relative bargaining
power of union i to the maximum i = 1. In that case, $k = w(1) and
Fk := Fk
 
w(1); $ k; n; Rku

. It follows that Uk and Fk are given for union
lobby k and employer lobby k.
In the equilibrium conditions (24), (25), (33), (34) and (35) with the
productivity-adjusted wages $k as unknown variables, there is perfect sym-
metry throughout all jurisdictions k 2 [0; n], provided that labor Li and hu-
man capital Hi were uniformly distributed throughout industries i 2 [0; 1].
Because labor and human capital face equal career prospects in all industries
i 2 [0; 1], they settle themselves down uniformly throughout i 2 [0; 1]. Given
(2) and (25), relative union bargaining power and the supplies of labor and
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human capital then become uniform throughout the economy:
wi = $k = $, Li = L and Hi = H for k 2 [0; 1] and i 2 [0; 1]. (38)
Noting (8), (20), (26), (28), (29), (30), (32), (36) and (38), the policy
maker's equilibrium conditions (34) become (cf. Appendix D)
el < L ,  = 0 with @
@$
< 0; el = L ,  < 0; (39)
where ($;n)
:
=
(a  1)ezw
r + (1  a)ez + elwel +

1

  1


$el + 1

1
n
eywey (40)
with
@
@( 1
n
)
=

1

  1| {z }
 


$el + 1| {z }
+
 eywey|{z}
 
> 0 for  > ': (41)
The result (39) and (40) can be explained as follows. The growth eect of
the productivity-adjusted wage $ is given by
(a  1)ezw
r + (1  a)ez : (42)
Its sign depends on the sign of ezw. The level eect is given byelwel|{z}
 
+

1

  1| {z }
 


$el + 1| {z }
+

1
n|{z}
+
eywey : (43)
If the level eect (43) is negative and dominates over the growth eect (42),
i.e.  < 0, then the labor market is deregulated: the productivity-adjusted
wage $ falls until the full-employment el($k; H) = L is attained [cf. (33)].
Otherwise, an increase in $ raises the welfare of the union lobby, creating
incentives for labor market regulation. The level eect (43) is an increasing
function (41) of the relative size 1
n
of a jurisdiction. Thus, it is the weaker,
the more industries i 2 Bk in jurisdiction k face competition from elsewhere.
8 Labor market integration
Without R&D, ! 0 [cf. (9)], there is no growth eect (42) and  < 0 [cf.
(40)]. From (39) it then follows that el = L. In other words:
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Proposition 1 The existence of R&D (i.e.  > 0) enables an equilibrium
with labor market regulation and unemployment el < L.
Without R&D, all human capital is devoted to production. In that case, both
lobbies attain their highest level of welfare in the presence of full employment,
having no incentives to lobby for labor market regulation.
If  > ', then, from (20), (39) and (40), it follows that ezw  0,  < 0
and el = L: Thus, unemployment el < L is possible only if  > '. Thus:
Proposition 2 Labor market regulation el < L is possible only if the elasticity
of product substitution is higher than that of factor substitution,  > '.
If the output eect dominates over the substitution eect (i.e.  > '), then
the growth eect is positive and can outweigh the level eect. Otherwise,
a decrease in the productivity-adjusted wage $ benets the lobbies and the
political process ends up with labor market deregulation.
The mass of a jurisdiction is 1
n
[cf. (1)]. Given (39) and (41),  < 0 andel = L holds for low values and  = 0 and el < L for high values of 1
n
. Thus:
Proposition 3 Assume that there exists a positive growth eect [i.e.  > '].
In that case, the labor markets are deregulated (l = L) for small and regulated
(l < L) for big jurisdictions.
If competition from outside the jurisdiction is weak (i.e. 1
n
close to one), then
the growth eect (42) outweighs the level eect (43) and lobbying leads to
labor market regulation. Otherwise, the labor markets are deregulated.
Dierentiating the rst-order condition  = 0 [cf. (39)] and noting (39)
and (41), one obtains
d$
d( 1
n
)
=   @
@( 1
n
)| {z }
+

@
@$|{z}
 
> 0: (44)
Given (11), (20), (26) and (38), the productivity growth rate becomes
g = (log a)ez($;H); dg
d$
= (log a)ezw > 0: (45)
According to Proposition 2, inequality  > ' holds true for l < L. From
this, (44) and (45) it follows that when l < L, both $ and g increase with
an increase in 1
n
. In other words:
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Proposition 4 If the labor markets are initially regulated, l < L, then labor
market integration (i.e. an increase in the size 1
n
of jurisdictions) raises both
the productivity-adjusted wage $ and the productivity growth rate g.
If the labor markets are initially regulated, then the growth eect is positive.
The expansion of jurisdictions weakens the negative level eect, for there
will be less competition from outside the jurisdiction. This strengthens the
incentives to lobby for labor market regulation, promoting R&D and growth.
9 Welfare considerations
The arrival rate of innovations of the leading-edge technology A [cf. (27)]
follows a Poisson process being in xed proportion  to aggregate innovation
intensity in the economy,
R 1
0
zidi [cf. (9), (20), (26) and (38)]:
 = 
Z 1
0
zidi = ez($;H): (46)
An invention of a new technology raises the serial number of the leading-edge
technology, t, by one and A(t) by constant a > 1 [cf. (10)]:
A(t+ 1) = aA(t); a > 1: (47)
From (7), (26), (28) and (38) it follows that consumption c is a function
of the productivity-adjusted wage $:
c($)
:
= A=( 1)ey($;H): (48)
This shows that the growth rate gc of consumption c is in xed proportion
=(  1) to the growth rate g of productivity A. Given (6), (4) and (48), the
expected welfare of the household at time T becomes
U($;T ) := E
Z 1
T
[log c($)]e ( T )d
= E
Z 1
T

log ey($;H) +  logA
  1

e r( T )d: (49)
Let $ be the productivity-adjusted wage corresponding to full employ-
ment el($;H) = L. Ignoring the full employment constraint el($;H)  L
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for a while, I maximize welfare (49) subject to technological change (46) and
(47) by the productivity-adjusted wage $. In Appendix E, I show that the
optimal value for the productivity-adjusted wage with unemployment is
$ = argmax
$

log ey($;H) +  log a
(  1)rez($;H)

:
(50)
If $ > $, then, noting (44) and (45), there is an optimal size ( 1
n
) of a
jurisdiction that corresponds to $(( 1
n
)) = $, and an optimal growth rate
g = (log a)ez($; H). Given (44) and (45), one obtains the following result:
Proposition 5 If jurisdictions are smaller than ( 1
n
), then the growth rate
is too low (g < g) and employment too high, and welfare can be improved by
increasing relative union bargaining power $ to $. If they are larger than
( 1
n
), then the growth rate is too high (g > g) and employment too low, and
welfare can be improved decreasing relative union bargaining power $ to $.
10 Conclusions
This document studies the political rationale for labor market (de)regulation.
Firms are oligopolists who employ human capital (i.e. key workers) in pro-
duction and R&D and (raw) labor in production. Human capital is fully em-
ployed, but the labor market can be regulated which causes unemployment.
The main result is that the observed tendency to labor market deregulation
comes from labor market policies being set up at the local level.
The political equilibrium is modeled as a common agency game where
workers and rms lobby policy makers to shift labor market regulations in
their favor. There are many jurisdictions, in each of them a self-interested
policy maker can (de)regulate the local labor market. Human capital always
fully employed and are the only one that can perform R&D production. The
tension between employers and employees comes from the assumption that
oligopolists perform R&D: without R&D, both workers and employers would
like to have deregulated markets.
When markets get more regulated (i.e. wages raise), the oligopolists in-
crease their output price and decrease their output so that there are less hu-
man capital in production (output eect). At the same time, the oligopolists
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replace labor by human capital (substitution eect). If the elasticity of prod-
uct substitution is higher than that of factor substitution, then the output
eect dominates over the substitution eect: labor market regulation de-
creases human capital devoted to production. Because human capital is fully
employed, more human capital is devoted to productivity-enhancing R&D.
If this positive growth eect outweighs the negative eect of wage increases
on income, then there are incentives to lobby for labor market regulation.
Otherwise, the labor markets are deregulated.
When labor markets become more integrated (i.e. the size of jurisdictions
increase), they face less competition from outside the jurisdiction so that the
fall of income due to wage increases is reduced and labor market regulation
gets more attractive to union lobbies. When labor markets are very little
integrated (i.e. jurisdictions are small), they are deregulated.
Appendix
A Equations (11) and (12)
During a short time interval d, oligopolist i has an innovation dqi = 1
with probability id, and no innovation dqi = 0 with probability 1  id.
Because technology changes from ti to ti+1 with probability id, and does
not change with probability 1 id during interval d, then, given (9) and
(10), one obtains (11):
gi
:
= iE[logAi(ti + 1)  logAi(ti)] = (log a)i = (log a)zi:
Dene the expected value

(ti) = E
Z 1
T
Ai(ti)e
 r( T )d: (51)
The Bellman equation is (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994)
r
(ti) = Ai(ti) + i


(ti + 1)  
(ti)

; (52)
where r
(ti) is the revenue from assets 
(ti) at the market interest rate r,
Ai(ti) current income from assets 
(ti) and i


(ti+1) 
(ti)

the expected
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increase of the value of assets 
(ti). Let us try the solution

(ti) = Ai(ti)=!; (53)
in which the discount factor ! > 0 is independent of ti. Inserting (53) into
the Bellman equation (52) yields
r =
Ai(ti)

(ti)
+ i


(ti + 1)

(ti)
  1

= ! + (a  1)i: (54)
Solving for ! from (54), inserting this into (53), noting (51) and (9) and
denoting productivity Ai at time T by AiT , one obtains (12):
E
Z 1
T
Ai(ti)e
 r( T )d = 
(ti) =
AiT
r + (1  a)i =
AiT
r + (1  a)zi :
B Functions (19) and (20)
Given (18), the planning problem of oligopolist i takes the form
(li; zi) = argmax
li;zi
E
Z 1
T
ie
 r( T )d = argmax
li;zi
i
r + (1  a)zi = argmaxli;zi ;
where 
:
=

log i   log[r + (1   a)zi]
	
. If oligopolist i has a unique equi-
librium, then, noting (17), these are equivalent to the rst-order conditions
@
@li
=
1
i
@i
@li
= 0;
@
@zi
=
(a  1)
r + (1  a)zi +
1
i
@i
@zi
= 0; (55)
and the second-order conditions
@2
@li
2 =
1
i
@2i
@l2i
< 0;
@2
@zi2
< 0; J =
@2
@li
2
@2
@zi2
 

@2
@li@zi
2
> 0: (56)
Furthermore, from hi = Hi   zi, (13), (17) and (55) it follows that
@2
@li@wi
=
1
i
@2i
@li@wi
=   1
i
< 0;
@2
@zi@wi
=
1
i
@2i
@zi@wi
 0;
@
@li
=
1
i
@i
@li
=

1  1


1
i

F 1=Fl   FhHi
F 1=

Flh
Fh
  1

Fl
F

  wi
  1

=

1  1


1
i

F 1=Fl

1 +

1

  1
'

Hi
Fh
F

  wi
  1

= 0;
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F 1=Fl

1 +

1

  1
'

Hi
Fh
F

=
wi
  1 > 0;
@2
@li@zi
=

1  1


1
i

F 1=Fl

1 +

1

  1
'

Hi
Fh
F

Flh
Fl
  1

Fh
F

+ F 1=Fl

1

  1
'

Hi
Fh
F

Fhh
Fh
  Fh
F

dhi
dzi|{z}
= 1
=

1

  1

1
i

F 1=Fl

1 +

1

  1
'

Hi
Fh
F

Flh
Fl
  1

Fh
F

+ F 1=Fl

1

  1
'

Hi
Fh
F

Fhh
Fh
  Fh
F

=

1

  1

1
i

wi
  1

Flh
Fl
  1

Fh
F

+ F 1=Fl

1
'
  1


Hi
Fh
F

Fh
F
  Fhh
Fh

=

1
'
  1


1

  1| {z }
 

1
i
Fh
F| {z }
+

wi
  1| {z }
+
+
HiFlFh
F 1+1=| {z }
+

Fh
F|{z}
+
  Fhh
Fh|{z}
 

< 0 , 1
'
>
1

,  > ': (57)
Dierentiating the rst-order conditions (55) yields the matrix equation"
@2
@li
2
@2
@li@zi
@2
@li@zi
@2
@zi2
# 
dli
dzi

+
   1
i
0

dwi = 0:
Noting (56) and (57), this can be written as partial derivatives as follows:
dli
dwi
=   1
J
   1i @
2
@li@zi
0 @
2
@zi2
 = 1J|{z}
+
1
i|{z}
+
@2
@zi2|{z}
 
< 0;
dzi
dwi
=   1
J
 @
2
@li
2   1i
@2
@li@zi
0
 =   1J|{z}
+
1
i|{z}
+
@2
@li@zi| {z }
 
> 0 ,  > ':
Dierentiating the production function (13) and noting these partial deriva-
tives and hi = Hi   zi, one obtains
dyi
dwi
= Fl
dli
dwi
+ Fh
dhi
dwi
= Fl|{z}
+
dli
dwi|{z}
 
  Fh|{z}
+
dzi
dwi|{z}
+
< 0 for  > '.
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C Function (28)
Noting (1), (7), (20), (27) and (38), consumption is determined as follows:
c($k; $ k; A; n)
:
=
"Z n
0
Z
i2Bk
Aiy
1 1=
i di

dk
#=( 1)
= A=( 1)
Z n
0
ey($k; Hi)1 1= Z
i2Bk
di

dk
=( 1)
=

A
n
=( 1)Z n
0
ey($k; Hi)1 1=dk=( 1)
;
where i 2 Bk. This implies
c

$` = $ and Hi = H for ` 2 [0; n] = A
=( 1)ey($;H);
1
c
@c
@$k
=
@ log c
@$k
=

  1
@
@$k
log
Z n
0
ey($`; Hi)1 1=d`
=
ey($k; Hi) 1=eyw($k; Hi)R n
0
ey($`)1 1=d` ;
1
c
@c
@$k

$` = $ and Hi = H for ` 2 [0; n]
=
eyw($;H)
ney($;H) < 0:
D Results (39) and (40)
From (17), (19), (20) and (22) it follows that
Wo +Wu =

max
li;zi
i
r + (1  a)zi +
wiel(wi; Hi)
r + (1  a)ez(wi; Hi)

c1= 1AiT
  (Rio +Riu)=r;
@(Wo +Wu)
@wi
=

1
r + (1  a)zi
@i
@wi|{z}
= li
+
el + wielw
r + (1  a)ez + (a  1)ezwwiel[r + (1  a)ez]2

 c1= 1AiT
=

wielw + (a  1)ezwwiel
r + (1  a)ez

c1= 1AiT
r + (1  a)ez
=
elwel + (a  1)ezwr + (1  a)ez

wielc1= 1AiT
r + (1  a)ez ; (58)
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@(Wo +Wu)
@c
=

1

  1

i + wiel
r + (1  a)ez c1= 2AiT : (59)
Noting (26), (28), (29), (30), (38), (58) and (59), one obtains
@(Fk + Uk)
@$k
=
@(Wo +Wu)
@wi
@wi
@$k
+
@(Wo +Wu)
@c
@c
@$k
=
@(Wo +Wu)
@wi
+
@(Wo +Wu)
@c
c
n
eywey
=
elwel + (a  1)ezwr + (1  a)ez

wielc1= 1AiT
r + (1  a)ez +

1

  1

(i + wiel)c1= 1
r + (1  a)ez AiTn eywey
= ($;n)
$elc1= 1AiT
r + (1  a)ez ;
where ($;n)
:
=
(a  1)ezw
r + (1  a)ez + elwel +

1

  1


$el + 1

1
n
eywey : (60)
From (32), (36) and (60), it follows that
@Gk
@$k
=
1
rn
@(Rko +Rku)
@$k
=
1
n

@Fk
@$k
+
@Uk
@$k

=
@(Fk + Uk)
@$k
= ($;n)
$elc1= 1AiT
r + (1  a)ez : (61)
Conditions (34) are equivalent to the maximization of the Lagrangean
Lk = Gk($k; $ k; n) + k[L  el($k)]
by the wage $k, where the multiplier k is subject to the conditions
k[L  el($k)] = 0; k  0: (62)
Given (20), (26), (38) and (61), this yields rst-order and second-order con-
ditions for the maximization:
@Lk
@$k
=
@Gk
@$k

(26);(38)
 kelw = $elc1= 1AiT=n
r + (1  a)ez| {z }
+
  k elw|{z}
 
= 0;
@
@$k
< 0 , @
2Gk
@$2k
< 0 , k = 0: (63)
The conditions (62) and (63) are equivalent to
el < L ,  = 0 with @
@$
< 0;el = L ,  > 0 ,  = k|{z}
+
elw|{z}
 
r + (1  a)ez
$elc1= 1AiT| {z }
+
< 0:
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E Result (50)
Dene the value function
(t) = max
$
E
Z 1
T

log ey($;H) +  logA(t)
  1

e r( T )d: (64)
If there is a stationary state solution in which the productivity-adjusted wage
$ is constant, then from (46), (47) and (64) it follows that
(t+ 1)  (t) = 
  1
Z 1
T
[logA(t+ 1)  logA(t)]e r( T )d
=
 log a
  1
Z 1
T
e ( T )d =
1
r
 log a
  1 : (65)
Noting (64) and (65), one can dene the Bellman equation for the maximiza-
tion (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994):
r(t) = max
$

log ey($;H) +  logA(t)
  1 + [(t+ 1)  (t)]

= max
$

log ey($;H) +  logA(t)
  1 +

r
 log a
  1

= max
$

log ey($;H) +  logA(t)
  1 +
 log a
(  1)rez($;H)

:
The solution for the value function is then given by
(t) =
1
r
max
$

log ey($;H) +  logA(t)
  1 +
 log a
(  1)rez($;H)

:
The optimal value for the productivity-adjusted wage is
$ = argmax
$

log ey($;H) +  logA(t)
  1 +
 log a
(  1)rez($;H)

= argmax
$

log ey($;H) +  log a
(  1)rez($;H)

:
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